The Data That Cost Nothing Still Changes Everything

In 2017, an economist named Avi Goldfarb walked into a conference room and asked a room full of executives a simple question: What would you pay for a single copy of the Oxford English Dictionary? The answers ranged from ten dollars to a hundred. Then he asked: What would you pay for the right to copy that dictionary an unlimited number of times? The room went quiet. Because the answer, once you think about it, is almost nothing.
That paradox is the quiet engine driving the entire digital economy. Goldfarb, along with Catherine E. Tucker, laid out the mechanics in a 2019 paper for the Journal of Economic Literature titled simply "Digital Economics" (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2019). It has since collected over 2,200 citations, not because it invented something new, but because it named something we all felt but couldn't articulate: digital technology doesn't just change what we buy. It changes the fundamental cost structure of economic activity.
The authors identified five categories of costs that digital technology has collapsed. Each one reshapes an industry, a market, or a human behavior. Together, they explain why data behaves less like a commodity and more like crude oil: valuable, messy, and capable of transforming everything it touches.
The Five Costs That Made Digital Economics Possible

Goldfarb and Tucker (2019) argue that digital technology, defined as the representation of information in bits, has reduced the cost of storage, computation, and transmission of data. But that's the plumbing. The real insight is what those reductions enable.
They break it into five distinct economic costs:
Search Costs: The Death of Friction
Before the internet, finding a product meant driving to a store, calling a catalog company, or trusting a friend's recommendation. Search costs were high enough that people routinely paid more than they had to, simply because the alternative was exhausting.
Digital technology slashed those costs. You can now compare prices across 50 vendors in 30 seconds. Goldfarb and Tucker (2019) note that this has forced markets toward greater price transparency and intensified competition. But it has also created a paradox: when search costs are zero, the quality of search becomes the battleground. Google, Amazon, and Netflix don't compete on access. They compete on curation.
Replication Costs: The Zero Marginal Cost Trap
This is the Oxford English Dictionary problem. Once you digitize a piece of information, copying it costs nearly nothing. The first copy of a song, a software program, or a scientific paper might cost millions to produce. The second copy costs a rounding error.
Goldfarb and Tucker (2019) point out that this breaks standard economic models. Normal goods get cheaper as you make more of them, but the price never hits zero. Digital goods can approach zero marginal cost, which creates a crisis for industries built on selling copies. Music labels, book publishers, and movie studios spent two decades fighting this reality. They lost. The winners, like Spotify and Netflix, found ways to charge for access rather than copies.
Transportation Costs: The Distance That Disappeared
Physical goods still cost money to move. But information goods? They travel at the speed of light. Goldfarb and Tucker (2019) emphasize that this has decoupled economic activity from geography in ways that are still unfolding. A programmer in Lagos can write code for a bank in London. A radiologist in Bangalore can read a scan from Boston.
But here is the twist: transportation costs for digital goods are not zero. They are just not measured in miles. They are measured in latency, bandwidth, and regulatory friction. The authors note that the reduction in transportation costs has actually increased the value of certain types of agglomeration. Silicon Valley is still Silicon Valley because proximity matters for trust, collaboration, and serendipity. The digital economy did not kill cities. It just changed what cities are for.
Tracking Costs: The Surveillance Bargain
This is the cost that most people feel in their bones. Digital technology has made it trivially cheap to track what people do, click, buy, and read. Goldfarb and Tucker (2019) describe how this has enabled a new kind of market: one where companies can personalize offers, prices, and content based on your individual history.
The authors found that tracking costs are so low that they have essentially inverted the traditional advertising model. Instead of broadcasting a message and hoping it reaches the right person, companies can now target a single individual with a tailored pitch. This is why your phone seems to know what you want before you do. It does not know. It just has very cheap data.
Verification Costs: Trust, But Verify
The fifth cost is the most subtle. Digital technology has reduced the cost of verifying who you are, what you own, and whether you are telling the truth. Credit scores, online reviews, and blockchain ledgers are all verification technologies.
Goldfarb and Tucker (2019) argue that this has enabled markets that would otherwise be impossible. Airbnb would not exist if hosts could not verify guest identities and guests could not verify host reputations. The same goes for Uber, eBay, and TaskRabbit. Low verification costs allow strangers to transact with each other. That is not a small thing. It is the foundation of the sharing economy, the gig economy, and the platform economy.
What This Actually Means for You and Your Business

The paper is not a policy brief. It is a framework. But frameworks are useful precisely because they let you see what is happening before the headlines catch up. Here is what Goldfarb and Tucker's (2019) analysis implies for the next decade:
- ▸If your business sells copies, you are in trouble. Music, movies, books, software, news. The marginal cost of replication is approaching zero. Your pricing model must shift from selling units to selling subscriptions, access, or experiences. The ones who survive will be the ones who stop thinking of themselves as content producers and start thinking of themselves as relationship managers.
- ▸If your business depends on search friction, you are already losing. Travel agencies, real estate brokers, and used car dealers all made money because it was hard for buyers to find sellers. That friction is gone. You cannot rebuild it. You can only add value that the search engine cannot: curation, trust, or expertise.
- ▸If your business collects data, you have a liability you are not pricing. Low tracking costs mean you can collect massive amounts of personal information. But the cost of storing and processing that data is not the real cost. The real cost is the trust you lose when you misuse it, and the regulation that is coming. Goldfarb and Tucker (2019) do not say this explicitly, but the implication is clear: cheap tracking creates cheap surveillance, and cheap surveillance creates backlash.
- ▸If your business depends on geography, you need to rethink why. The reduction in transportation costs for information means that any task that can be done remotely will eventually be done remotely. The only businesses that will retain geographic advantages are those built on physical presence: hospitality, healthcare, live events, and logistics. If you are a consultant, a designer, or a lawyer, your location is now a choice, not a constraint.
What the Research Does Not Prove
Goldfarb and Tucker (2019) are careful not to overclaim. They do not argue that digital technology eliminates all costs. They argue that it reduces five specific costs. That is a meaningful distinction.
The paper does not prove that digital economics is always better for consumers. Lower search costs can lead to price discrimination. Lower tracking costs can lead to privacy violations. Lower verification costs can lead to surveillance. The authors acknowledge these trade-offs but do not resolve them. That is not a weakness of the paper. It is an open research question.
The paper also does not address the distributional consequences of these cost reductions. Who wins when search costs fall? The big platforms. Who loses? The small businesses that cannot afford to bid on keywords. Who wins when replication costs fall? The creators who can reach a global audience. Who loses? The intermediaries who used to control access.
These are not gaps in the paper. They are invitations for the next generation of research.
The Surprising Conclusion: Data Is Not the New Oil
The phrase "data is the new oil" has been repeated so often it has become a cliché. Goldfarb and Tucker (2019) suggest something more interesting. Oil is a rival good. If I burn a barrel, you cannot burn it. Data is nonrival. If I use a piece of data, you can still use it. Oil becomes more valuable as it becomes scarce. Data becomes more valuable as it becomes abundant.
The real analogy is not oil. It is infrastructure. Data is like roads. A single road is not very useful. A network of roads connecting cities, ports, and factories is transformative. The value comes not from the asphalt but from the connections.
Goldfarb and Tucker (2019) have given us a map of that infrastructure. They have shown us where the costs fell, where the bottlenecks remain, and where the opportunities lie. The rest is up to us.
References
- [1]Avi Goldfarb, Catherine E. Tucker (2019). Digital Economics. Journal of Economic LiteratureDOI· 2,229 citations
