Civilizationism Is Reshaping Global Politics

The New Battle Lines Are Civilizational, Not National

In 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping stood before a gathering of world leaders and declared that humanity was entering a new era defined by the "clash of civilizations." It was a curious phrase to borrow from Samuel Huntington's famously controversial 1990s thesis, especially coming from a communist leader. But Xi wasn't warning about conflict. He was proposing an alternative: "civilizations" should coexist, each preserving its unique essence, rather than being homogenized by Western values.

A year earlier, Russian President Vladimir Putin had told an audience in Sochi that "the liberal idea has outlived its purpose." He framed Russia not as a nation state in the European mold, but as a distinct "civilization state" with its own moral code and political logic. In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan routinely invokes Ottoman and Islamic civilizational grandeur. In India, Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party speaks of "civilizational nationalism." And in the United States and Europe, far right parties from Marine Le Pen to Viktor Orban argue that the West itself is a civilization under threat from within.

Something strange is happening. For decades, the dominant story of global politics was about nations. Nations had interests. Nations competed, cooperated, and negotiated. But now, leaders across the ideological spectrum are talking about something bigger, older, and more abstract: civilizations.

This is not just rhetoric. According to a 2023 paper by political scientists Gregorio Bettiza, Derek Bolton, and David Lewis, published in International Studies Review, we are witnessing the rise of a coherent ideological framework they call "civilizationism" (Bettiza et al., 2023). And it is reshaping the foundations of global order in ways that most of us have not yet fully grasped.

How Did Civilization Become a Political Weapon?

The paper's central argument is counterintuitive. You might assume that civilizational talk is a return to ancient identities, a natural expression of cultural pride, or a backlash against globalization. Bettiza and colleagues offer a different explanation: civilizationism is a specific ideological reaction to the liberal international order that emerged after the Cold War.

To understand this, you have to understand what the authors call the "liberal standard of civilization." This is not a formal treaty or set of laws. It is an informal, universal standard that defines what counts as a legitimate, modern, civilized state. It includes things like democracy, human rights, free markets, rule of law, and individual liberty. States that meet this standard are treated as full members of the international community. Those that do not are stigmatized, pressured, or excluded.

The authors argue that this liberal standard is itself a form of civilizationism, but one that presents itself as universal and neutral. It is the ideological engine of the post Cold War order, the invisible framework that judges all nations by the same yardstick (Bettiza et al., 2023).

But here is the problem. For many states and political actors, this yardstick feels like a trap. They are measured against standards they cannot fully meet, either because of political constraints, cultural differences, or outright opposition to liberal values. And when they fall short, they are labeled as backward, authoritarian, or uncivilized. This creates what the authors call "symbolic disempowerment."

The Trap of the Liberal Standard

The paper identifies two mechanisms through which the liberal standard entraps non liberal actors: socialization and stigmatization.

Socialization works subtly. International institutions, diplomatic norms, economic partnerships, and even educational exchanges all nudge states toward adopting liberal norms. Over time, elites internalize these standards and feel pressure to conform. But conforming is never complete. There is always a gap between the ideal and the reality, and that gap becomes a source of shame or inadequacy.

Stigmatization is more explicit. When a state violates liberal norms, it is publicly shamed. Sanctions are imposed. Its leaders are denounced. Its people are portrayed as victims of tyranny. The authors point to Russia's annexation of Crimea, China's treatment of Uyghurs, and Turkey's crackdown on journalists as examples where liberal actors have used civilizational language to condemn non liberal behavior (Bettiza et al., 2023).

The result is a profound sense of resentment. Leaders in Russia, China, Turkey, and elsewhere feel that they are being judged by a standard they never agreed to, enforced by powers that do not always live up to their own ideals. The liberal order, they argue, is not universal. It is a Western civilization project dressed up as universalism.

Civilizationism as an Escape Route

This is where civilizationism comes in. Bettiza and colleagues argue that civilizationism provides an ideological escape from the trap of the liberal standard. It does three things.

First, it offers a distinct and valued sense of collective belonging. Instead of being a failed liberal state, you are a proud member of a great civilization. Russia is not a flawed democracy; it is a unique Eurasian civilization with its own values of sovereignty, tradition, and spirituality. China is not a human rights violator; it is a 5,000 year old civilization with its own concept of harmony and order. Turkey is not an authoritarian backslider; it is the heir to Ottoman and Islamic civilization, with a moral duty to lead the Muslim world.

Second, civilizationism provides an alternative normative system. Each civilization has its own set of values that are presented as equally valid, or even superior, to liberal ones. The authors note that these alternative systems are generally illiberal: they prioritize order over freedom, community over individual rights, and hierarchy over equality (Bettiza et al., 2023).

Third, civilizationism offers a vision of international order that is multipolar rather than universal. Instead of one liberal order, the world should be a concert of civilizations, each with its own sphere of influence and its own rules. This is the vision Xi Jinping promotes with his "community with a shared future for mankind," and it is the logic behind Putin's call for a "Greater Eurasia."

The Method Behind the Argument

How did Bettiza, Bolton, and Lewis arrive at this conclusion? Their paper is not a single empirical study but a theoretical synthesis grounded in extensive analysis of political discourse, policy documents, and historical patterns. They examined speeches by leaders in the United States, Europe, China, Russia, Turkey, and India, as well as the writings of intellectuals and think tanks that promote civilizational ideas. They also traced the evolution of the liberal international order from the end of the Cold War to the present, paying close attention to moments of tension and contestation.

The authors are clear that they are not claiming civilizationism is the only force shaping global politics. Economic interests, security concerns, and domestic politics all matter. But they argue that the ideological dimension has been underappreciated, and that civilizationism provides a particularly powerful framework for understanding why certain conflicts and alliances are forming.

Their evidence is strongest in the cases of Russia and China, where civilizational rhetoric is most explicit and most central to state ideology. It is weaker but still suggestive in the cases of Turkey and India, where civilizationalism competes with other nationalist and religious ideologies. And it is most contested in the West itself, where far right movements use civilizational language to defend a threatened "Judeo Christian" identity, while liberal internationalists continue to insist on universal values.

What This Research Does Not Prove

It is important to be honest about the limits of this argument. The paper does not prove that civilizationism is the primary cause of any specific conflict or policy. It does not demonstrate that leaders who use civilizational rhetoric are sincere, or that they are simply manipulating ancient identities for political gain. It does not show that civilizationism is inevitable or irreversible.

The authors themselves acknowledge that civilizationism is an ideological construct, not a natural fact. Civilizations are not fixed entities with clear boundaries. They are invented, contested, and constantly redefined. The idea of a "Western civilization" or an "Islamic civilization" or a "Chinese civilization" is a political tool, not a description of reality.

This raises an interesting open question: if civilizationism is a constructed ideology, can it be deconstructed? Can liberal internationalists respond to civilizational challenges by acknowledging the partiality of their own standards, or does that simply legitimize the civilizational frame? The paper does not answer this question, but it implies that the liberal order cannot simply dismiss civilizationism as irrational nationalism. It must engage with the genuine grievances that fuel it.

The Consequences Are Already Visible

The implications of this research extend far beyond academic debates. If Bettiza and colleagues are right, then we are witnessing a fundamental shift in how political actors understand themselves and their enemies.

Consider the war in Ukraine. Russia frames it not as a territorial dispute but as a civilizational war against a decadent West that is trying to destroy traditional values. Ukraine, in turn, frames itself as defending European civilization against Asian despotism. Both sides use civilizational language to mobilize support and justify extreme measures.

Consider the tensions between the United States and China. The Biden administration has increasingly framed the rivalry as a competition between democracy and autocracy, which is itself a civilizational framing. China responds by accusing the West of trying to impose its civilization on others, and offers its own model as an alternative.

Consider the rise of populism in Europe and the United States. Far right parties argue that liberal elites are betraying Western civilization by allowing mass immigration and multiculturalism. They call for a return to civilizational purity, often with explicitly racial or religious undertones.

In each of these cases, the language of civilization makes compromise harder. If you are defending a civilization, you cannot negotiate. You cannot compromise with an existential threat. You can only fight or submit.

Why This Matters for the Liberal Order

The paper's most provocative claim is that the liberal international order itself is a form of civilizationism, and that this is its weakness. By presenting itself as universal and neutral, the liberal order hides its own particularity. It demands that all states adopt liberal norms, but it cannot admit that those norms are rooted in a specific historical and cultural tradition.

This creates a double standard that non liberal actors are quick to exploit. When the United States invades Iraq to spread democracy, or when European Union lectures Turkey on human rights while ignoring Saudi Arabia, the hypocrisy is glaring. Civilizationism provides a language for calling out that hypocrisy and demanding an alternative.

The authors argue that the liberal order can survive only if it becomes more self aware and more pluralistic. It must acknowledge that there are multiple legitimate ways of organizing political life, and that liberal values are not the only path to human flourishing. But this is a risky move. If the liberal order abandons its universal claims, it loses its moral authority. If it insists on them, it fuels resentment and resistance.

What This Actually Means

• ▸If you are a diplomat or policymaker, stop assuming that liberal norms are self evidently superior. Engage with civilizational arguments on their own terms, not by dismissing them as irrational or backward. The resentment is real, and it will not go away by ignoring it.

• ▸If you are a journalist or commentator, be careful not to adopt civilizational frames uncritically. When leaders talk about "Western civilization" or "Islamic civilization," ask who is defining those terms and for what purpose. Civilization is a political tool, not a natural category.

• ▸If you are a citizen, recognize that the language of civilization is being used to justify authoritarianism, nationalism, and exclusion. It is a way of saying that some people belong and others do not, based on ancient and unchanging identities. That is a dangerous idea, no matter who is using it.

• ▸If you are an academic, the paper by Bettiza, Bolton, and Lewis is a valuable framework for understanding contemporary politics, but it needs to be tested against more cases and more data. Does civilizationism explain the behavior of smaller powers? Does it apply to non state actors? How does it interact with economic and security interests?

• ▸If you are a human being living in the 21st century, be aware that the ground is shifting beneath your feet. The old certainties of nation states and international institutions are giving way to something older and more turbulent: the return of civilizations as political actors. Whether this leads to dialogue or destruction depends on whether we can understand what is happening before it is too late.